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Much has been written on the macroeconomic aspects of
the economic reform process in Latin America, but much
less has been published on its microeconomic results,
especially at the company level. This paper explores how
Embraer, a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer, transformed itself
after privatization to become a world market leader in a high-
tech industry traditionally dominated by companies based
in member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Its main findings
are that top management played a key role in aligning
innovation for dynamic capabilites, that the company has
been very successful in forming alliances with foreign
partners and strengthening its bargaining position, and that
the Brazilian authorities have consistently supported
Embraer after relinquishing direct control. For these results
to be extended to other companies, however, Brazil’s export
promotion tools must be made compatible with multilateral
norms.
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“We are engineering minded […],
not fanatical about the business side”
JUAREZ WANDERLEY, President of EMBRAER
Financial Times, 6 June 1995
“EMBRAER’s aircraft are developed
with customer satisfaction in mind”
MAURICIO BOTELHO, President of EMBRAER
InfoBrazil, 26 May 2000
I
Introduction
Large industrial enterprises have historically played a
vital role in developing new technologies, marketing
new products, and introducing new organizational
forms (Chandler, Amatori and Hikino, 1997). In this
way, they have contributed to economic growth and
development in Europe, North America, and East Asia,
although of course they may have also generated
inefficiencies, especially through their ability to lobby
for wrong policies (Goldberg and Maggi, 1999). What
is conspicuous about Latin America is the region’s
inability to nurture big firms, especially if they are
private-owned and/or export-oriented. There are of
course more than a few relatively large private
diversified groups —indeed, they constitute the
backbone of the business community in most
developing countries— but they mostly cater for the
domestic market and are hardly market leaders in their
lines of business. And there are also some large
exporters, which may sometimes even claim a large
share of the world market for their goods, but these are
mostly State-owned concerns exploiting non-renewable
mineral resources such as oil and copper.
One of the few Latin American manufacturing
companies that can justifiably claim to be a world leader
in its market is Brazil’s Embraer, which vies with
Bombardier for the third place in the world ranking of
aircraft manufacturers —and is more profitable than
its Canadian arch-rival. In this industry, success depends
on sound design and manufacturing strength,1 the price
and operational costs of the aircraft, and the after-sales
services provided to customers, who are relatively few
in number but are spread around the world. Launch
and research and development (R&D) costs, as well as
survival risk, are high, but cost reductions over time
from learning by doing are unusually large. In short,
this is a global oligopolistic sector, where, not
surprisingly, almost all the countries now offering
world-class planes were already established in aviation
by the end of World War I.
The purposes of this paper are two-fold. First, to
add to the literature on the results of privatization by
exploring the continuity in Embraer’s corporate history
and determining to what extent the resources, skills and
learning capabilities that have proved crucial in gaining
market shares on world markets in the 1990s had been
accumulated under public ownership and how the
transfer of ownership has made it possible to turn them
into sources of competitive advantage. Second, to
contribute to the literature on the forms of State
intervention supporting industrial transformation by
looking at a concrete example in a high-tech industry
(Embraer) to find out how this company interacts with
the Brazilian government apparatus and the global
economy, whether a successful Latin American
I am grateful to Roberto Carlos Bernardes, Takahiro Fujimoto,
and various executives of Embraer for conversations on the subject
matter of this paper and to Edmund Amman, Steve McGuire,
Richard Moxon, Nelson Silva and Paulo Bastos Tigre, as well as
the participants in the seminars of the Center for Brazilian Studies
(Oxford), INSEAD, the National University of Singapore and three
anonymous referees, for their comments and suggestions. The usual
disclaimers apply: in particular, the opinions expressed do not
reflect the position of the OECD, the OECD Development Centre, or
the organization’s member States.
1 The actual manufacture of an aircraft consists of three principal
stages: i) fabrication of primary parts (metal sheets and plates, parts
produced using computerized and non-computerized machines, and
prefabricated parts); ii) assembly of major components, and iii)
final installation of the aircraft’s various operating systems (such
as wiring and electronics) in the structure.
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company like this is any different from its competitors
in more advanced industrial countries, and to what
extent its dynamics can be successfully replicated in
other industries and/or countries.
Having stated what this paper is about, it is equally
important to specify what it is not about. First, it does
not test quantitatively whether public intervention has
been successful domestically, i.e., whether the benefits
outweighed the costs, and internationally, i.e., whether
that intervention served to increase competition in the
world market for regional jets.2 Second, and related
with the foregoing, it does not seek to explain the
circumstances in which governments support a
domestic industry up to the point of risking external
retaliation. The literature on strategic trade policy does
both these things, using two separate approaches. As
far as modeling is concerned, it would be interesting to
update the results of Baldwin and Flam (1989), who
included Embraer in a 3-country study of the market
for 30-40 seat commuter aircraft; as far as political
science is concerned, Goldstein and McGuire (2002)
analyse Embraer in parallel with its Canadian rival,
using the framework developed in Busch (1999).
The next two sections present the history of the
company, first as a State-owned entity (section II) and
then in the period following privatization (section III),
with the aim of identifying the specific focuses of
business competence accounting for the rise of Embraer
in the 1970s and 1980s, the reasons why difficulties
subsequently arose, and the elements of continuity and
change since 1994. These factors are then analysed in
section IV, while the conclusions (section V) link this
case study to the wider debate on the results of
privatization, the role of the State in nurturing industrial
transformation, and the contribution of large industrial
enterprises to this process.
II
EMBRAER as a State-owned enterprise: 1969-1994
1. The origins
The Brazilian armed forces have had an active and
ongoing interest in industrialization since the 19th
century, and an industrialist-technocratic orientation
developed within them in the 1940s (Sikkink, 1991).
Influential military thinkers, such as General Carlos de
Meira Mattos, developed a geostrategic theory of
Brazil’s place in the world system predicated on the
country’s success in achieving technological and
industrial autonomy. As regards the aeronautical sector,
concrete strategies involved a market reserve policy,
State financing, and technological support to private
firms through the Centro Tecnológico Aerospacial
(Aerospace Technology Centre) (CTA),3 established in
1945 at São José dos Campos, in the state of São Paulo,
because of the availability of electrical power, a pleasant
climate, and excellent topography (Campolina Diniz
and Razavi, 1999). The CTA, an umbrella organization
for aeronautical research modeled on the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, grew to become “probably the
most advanced research [institution] among
industrializing countries” (Dahlman and Frischtak,
1993, p. 437), and led to the establishment of sister
institutions devoted to technical training (Instituto
Tecnológico da Aeronáutica (Institute of Aeronautical
Technology) (ITA)) and aerospace research (Instituto
de Pesquisas Espaciais, INPE).
Various prototypes were built and some, such as
the Paulistinha, entered into production. In the early
1960s the Brazilian economy ran out of steam and the
ensuing deterioration in political stability eventually
led to a coup in 1964 and to 21 years of military rule.
While they fully accepted private ownership, the
military directed greater efforts towards development
planning and increased resources were allocated to
science and technology. For reasons of national security,
it was argued, Brazil could not afford to depend on
imported aircraft and spare parts, nor could it allow the
domestic manufacture of such strategic equipment to
2 In 1991 the European Union blocked the takeover of De Havilland
by the Franco-Italian ATR consortium on the grounds that the merged
firm would have dominated the turbo-prop aircraft market.
Bombardier eventually bought up its smaller Canadian rival. A
formal analysis of the market for regional jets, which ATR has not
entered, could determine whether Brazilian export subsidies, insofar
as they prevented Bombardier from acquiring monopoly power,
have increased consumer welfare.
3 In 1971 the CTA changed its name to Centro Técnico Aeroespacial
(Technical Centre for Aerospace Activities).
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be controlled by foreign companies. A revival of the
alliance between public sector technicians and the
military, which had been so important for the founding
of State-owned enterprises in the 1940s and 1950s
(Trebat, 1983), led to the creation of Embraer (Empresa
Brasileira de Aeronautica – Brazilian Aeronautical
Corporation) in 1969.4 Embraer was majority-owned
by the government and inherited some mission-oriented
activities from the CTA, especially the IPD-6504 project
to produce a prototype of a twin-engine turbo-prop
plane. Although the relationship between the company
and the Ministry of Aeronautics remained very close,
much bureaucratic red tape was avoided and a clear
sense of corporate mission emerged.5 Not only did the
Ministry manipulate the domestic market to Embraer’s
advantage,6 but it also concentrated in its hands most
financial, fiscal, marketing, regulatory, and international
responsibilities, which were transferred to Embraer. In
addition, the firm was able to provide customers with
alternate financing through BNDES (a State development
bank), it benefited from FINEX (Fundo de
Financiamento à Exportação – Export Finance Fund),
an export support scheme administered by Banco do
Brasil, and it was granted very generous tax holidays.7
Finally, in 1973 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs set up
PNEMEM (Política Nacional de Exportação de Material
de Emprego Militar – National Military Materiel Export
Policy), an ad hoc program to promote arms exports.
2. The rise
Production started in the 1970s in co-operation with
foreign partners, under co-production and licensing
arrangements designed to achieve rapid market
penetration without excessive technological
dependence. The need to limit the degree of vertical
integration was recognized early on as a key imperative,
in order to avoid the risk of excessive fragmentation of
business operations that had doomed previous attempts
at manufacturing aircraft in Brazil (Silva, 1998, p. 177).8
For the most part, Embraer shied away from
manufacturing high-value, high-technology
components and concentrated instead on designing the
aircraft, producing fuselages, and assembling the final
product: already in the 1970s it signed long-term
purchase agreements with its major suppliers. Its two
best-selling planes —the two-seat Tucano turbo-prop
military trainer and the 19-seat non-pressurized twin-
engine turbo-prop Bandeirante— were of national
design, although more than half of the latter’s value
consisted of imported parts. Particularly fruitful
collaboration with Italian partners led to the production
of the Xavante jet trainer and ground-attack plane
(under license from Aermacchi) and of the AMX (in joint
venture with Aeritalia and Aermacchi), a subsonic
(Mach 0.86) ground-attack aircraft for battlefield
interdiction, close air support, and reconnaissance
missions. Embraer also used the threat of a steep
increase in import duties to successfully arm-twist
foreign producers of general aviation aircraft into
accepting an agreement whereby they had to provide
the kits to assemble the final product in Brazil. Piper,
which accepted this offer, increased its market share
dramatically at the expense of its competitors, Beech
and Cessna. Besides technical competence, all these
partners provided Embraer with organizational know-
how in series production.9 Within the Grupo Permanente
4 Other important defence companies in São José dos Campos which
also spun off from CTA are Avibras (established in 1961) for the
production of missiles and Engesa (set up in 1975) for the
manufacture of tanks and armoured vehicles. In the 1980s, Avibras
sold an estimated 66 Astros II multiple rocket launchers to Iraq
and an unspecified number to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar.
Total sales of the Astros II between 1982 and 1987 reached US$ 1
billion. While Avibras has been highly dependent on imported
components, Engesa developed its own design and technology
capabilities and was more integrated with the local industrial base,
especially auto parts manufacturers. See Brazil Special Weapons
Guide at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/brazil/index.html.
5 The composition of the board of directors remained the same
between 1969 and 1986 (Silva, 1998, p. 567).
6 The government and the Brazilian Armed Forces bought roughly
a third of the Bandeirantes produced before 1980. They usually
paid up-front and directly contributed to development expenditures.
7 All weapons-producing companies were exempted from duties
on the import of inputs. Moreover, Embraer did not pay trade (ICM)
and production (IPI) taxes. Furthermore, all Brazilian companies
buying non-voting shares in Embraer could obtain a 1% rebate on
corporate income tax. Federal agencies were also required to buy
Brazilian aircraft provided their price was not more than 15% higher
than that of competing imported goods. Finally, aircraft imports
were subject to a 50% duty if a competing Brazilian product was
available.
8 Insofar as poaching qualified staff from CTA/ITA reduced these
institutions’ pool of technical skills, however, Embraer
paradoxically ended up with excessive internalization of R&D
activities (Dagnino, 1993, p. 15).
9 Since the 1980s Embraer has been the sole subcontractor for the
design and production of outboard flaps for the McDonnell Douglas
MD-11, as well as for the production of the tail fin and wing tips
for the Boeing 777. It also manufactures precision-machined parts
for the 747 and 767.
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de Mobilização Industrial (Standing Industrial
Mobilization Group), which had brought together the
Armed Forces and the Federation of São Paulo
Industries since 1965, Embraer also developed close
collaboration with Brazilian private firms, which
supplied an increasing share of the final components.
Half of Embraer’s directors were also private sector
executives (Silva, 1998, p. 256). Although equity links
were relatively tenuous, aeronautics could thus be seen
as a good example of the “triple alliance” between
multinational corporations, local private entrepreneurs
and State-owned enterprises which accounted for
Brazil’s rapid capital accumulation up to the early 1980s
(Evans, 1979).
A strong focus on the export market was another
priority set from the very beginning and proved crucial
in offsetting development costs. It permitted longer
production runs, stimulated customers to bring new
ideas for technical change, and demanded exacting
performance standards. In order to be certified on all
major markets, Embraer’s products included backup
systems for major functions and appropriate safety
margins for structural components. But the company
correctly saw a niche for aircraft that could operate in
the more difficult environment (harsh weather
conditions, unprepared or unpaved airstrips, minimum
ground support) of backward regions and countries and
were easier and cheaper to maintain.10 The Bandeirante
joined the fleets of a number of commuter airlines in
the United States, accounting by 1982 for a third of the
market for 10-20 seat commuters at the expense of
American manufacturers (Dagnino, 1993, p. 9).11 As
they lacked finance and the capabilities to design a
competitive product, rivals such as Beech and Fairchild
were unable to respond to the introduction of the
Bandeirante. The same logic was behind the production
of military aircraft that were less sophisticated than
those exported by advanced industrial countries. Thus,
the Tucano, which combined low cost and innovative
technical solutions (e.g., ejection seats and tandem
pupil-trainer alignment), was sold to the British and
French air forces and produced in Egypt under license.
The net foreign exchange impact, however, was minor
and spillovers, if any, never reached a critical level, not
least because of the obstacles to labour mobility posed
by the dual nature (civil and military) of the technology
developed and used by Embraer’s technicians
(Frischtak, 1992).
3. The crisis
While the debt crisis ended the period of low finance
costs that had supported the rise of the Brazilian
aerospace industry, the time of reckoning did not arrive
for Embraer until the early 1990s. True, as the post-
1982 economic crisis took its toll on Brazilian
corporations, drastically reducing their profits and
therefore their tax commitments, the mechanism
designed to provide private equity finance to Embraer
dried up and the government’s stake in its ownership
increased accordingly. Even so, in the peculiar
framework of the post-1985 Brazilian democratic
transition, the air force heads successfully resisted the
cancellation of ministerial status and managed to protect
the corresponding budget appropriation from the calls
for fiscal discipline emanating from the Finance
Ministry and the Bretton Woods institutions (Solingen,
1998).12
The EMB-120 Brasília, a 30-seat pressurized turbo-
prop derived from the Bandeirante, was launched in
1985 and was supposed to become the firm’s main
aircraft.13 To design and produce this new plane,
considerable investment was made in the areas of metal-
to-metal bonding, chemical milling, and composite
materials manufacturing (Frischtak, 1992). Thanks to
its low operating costs, high dispatchability, and
relatively high cruising speed, the Brasília met with
initial success, capturing a third of the total market for
30-40 seat commuters (Baldwin and Flam, 1989,
Table 1, p. 493).14 The world recession in the late 1980s
and the Brazilian government’s decision to discontinue
FINEX, however, hit Embraer. Furthermore, the
10 While turboprops are less powerful than straight jets, they have
wider wings and therefore require shorter runways. They also
consume less fuel.
11 Since brand recognition is an important aspect in the aircraft
market, Embraer faced a huge initial obstacle because its name
was unknown to travellers —and faith in a Brazilian-made plane
was also very low (Silva, 1998, p. 375).
12 In 1998, President Cardoso finally managed to set up a unified
Defence Ministry headed by a civilian, in place of separate
ministries run by each service: a change that had happened a decade
or so earlier in the rest of South America.
13 The Xingu executive plane, the first pressurized aircraft produced
by Embraer, proved a commercial failure but allowed the company
to accumulate knowledge later used in developing the Brasilia.
14 Simulation experiments suggest that export subsidies proved
effective in shifting profits to Embraer (Baldwin and Flam, 1989).
In 1982, questioning the fairness of subsidies granted for exports
of the Bandeirante, Fairchild filed an ultimately-rejected complaint
before the US International Trade Commission.
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simultaneous attempt to develop a smaller derivate, the
CBA-123, in cooperation with Argentina’s Fábrica
Militar de Aviones (FAMA) turned into a flop. While
technically sophisticated, the plane was too expensive,
not least because FAMA did not have the capacities
required to cooperate with Embraer. Political
motivations —to strengthen bilateral co-operation and
build mutual trust with Argentina— primed over
business considerations and, following the departure
of Silva in 1986 to assume the presidency of Petrobras,
Embraer could not resist them. Cash-flow management
suffered: in an industry where long-term financing is
indispensable to match extended development lead
times, the company accumulated debt with a
dangerously short time-profile. As explained by
Frischtak (1992, p. 21), “the presence of specialized
skills and endowments accumulated in the process of
developing [the AMX and the Brasília…] presented
Embraer’s engineers with an ‘opportunity’ [to produce]
an overdesigned [aircraft] (in the sense of not respecting
market constraints: price)”. Although Embraer had been
able to build competitiveness and secure an important
presence on overseas markets, the preeminence of
engineering over marketing considerations does not
surprise in view of the company’s long-term reliance
on public procurement. The military are customers who
attach notoriously high importance to performance
requirements, and indeed it was in the context of the
AMX project that Embraer installed a CAD/CAM
computer-aided design system: the first company in
Brazil to dispose of such technology (Sbragia and Terra,
1993, p. 3).
During the Collor and Franco administrations
(1990-1994), political circumstances further hindered
the launch of economic adjustment, privatization, and
structural adjustment measures. The end of the Iran-
Iraq war,15 the lower intensity of the Angola conflict,
and the more aggressive stance of the United States
government in supporting American producers, closed
export markets for Embraer’s military equipment. As
delays mounted and orders were cancelled, the cost of
managing the inventory of unsold planes rose. Some
of Embraer’s specialized suppliers, such as Engesa and
Tecnasa, went bankrupt and the unemployment rate in
São José dos Campos reached a level twice as high as
that of the state of São Paulo as a whole (Broinizi
Pereira, 1991).16 Despite efforts to diversify into
services and other activities, in 1994 Embraer made a
loss of US$ 310 million, with sales of only US$ 177
million (table 1) and its place in the ranking of Brazil’s
largest exporters fell to 38th. The return of Silva in 1991
could do little to reverse this decline, although it may
have proved crucial in accelerating the subsequent
privatization.
III
Embraer as a private company
1. The privatization operation
Despite the opposition of the military and a long strike
in 1990, the worsening economic situation led the
government in January 1992 to include Embraer in the
list of State-owned enterprises to be sold. Following
six failed attempts, in December 1994 a consortium
bought a controlling 45% stake for US$ 89 million.
The syndicate included American investors assembled
by Wasserstein Perella, a New York investment
boutique; Bozano Simonsen, one of Brazil’s greatest
financial conglomerates; and Previ and Sistel, the
pension funds of the Banco do Brasil and Telebrás,
15 Nearly 40% of all Brazilian arms sales from 1985 to 1989 went
to Iraq. Precise financial data on the importance of the Middle East
market for Embraer are not available. The company received orders
for the EMB-312 Tucano (110 from Egypt in 1983, 80 from Iraq in
1985, 50 from Iran in 1988, and 100 from Libya in 1986), the EMB-
111 marine patrol aircraft (two from Algeria in 1982 and eight
from Libya in 1986), and the EMB-121 Xingu (25 from Libya in
1986).
16 All Avibras programmes were put on hold in January 1990, when
the company filed for bankruptcy. Its employee roster had fallen
from 6,000 to 900 and the company had US$ 90 million worth of
unsold rockets. Avibras improved its financial health in the early
1990s, and signed a deal with NASA in 1994 for the joint
development of a rocket programme. Engesa has been dismembered,
with some of its companies sold to private interests, and with
ordnance-related firms taken over by the State and integrated with
Imbel (Indústria de Material Bélico – War Materiel Industry).
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respectively.17 The government injected new capital,
assumed the debt (US$ 700 million), and retained 6.8%
of the company’s stock, including a “golden share”
carrying veto power over, among other things, change
of control and corporate purpose and creation and
alteration of defence programmes (regardless of
whether or not the Brazilian government participates
in such programmes).18 Clauses included in the
agreement limited foreign ownership to 40% and
imposed a 6-month moratorium on layoffs.
The new owners hired an outside executive to chair
the firm (although to this day three of the six executive
vice-presidents are long-time Embraer executives),
injected R$ 413.6 million since 1996 to strengthen the
company’s equity base, and intensified efforts to
improve the profile and conditions of its heavy debt
burden. Production methods and processes were
improved, including substantial investment in IT
systems, leading in July 1997 to the award of ISO 9001
certification for quality in design, production, sales and
service. A fully-owned finance company to help airlines
to lease, rather than buy, new aircraft and trade in used
ones was set up in the Cayman Islands. An international
consultancy firm designed a new organizational chart,
which instead of being built around strict functional
specifications is structured around single projects to
enhance flexibility, interaction, and autonomy.
Services such as site maintenance, transportation,
catering, security and machinery upkeep were
TABLE 1
Embraer: Main financial data
(in millions of US dollars)a
Average
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 20011985-91
Gross revenues 440 333 261 177 295 390 772 1,362 1,861 2,859 2,929
Of which (per cent)
Domestic market 45 68 62 60 61 65 16 11 5 2 2
Export 55 32 38 40 39 35 84 89 95 98 98
Of which (per cent)
Civil, incl. services .. .. .. .. .. .. 88 84 94 96
Defence .. .. .. .. .. .. 12 16 6 4
Net earnings -62 -258 -116 -310 -253 -122 -31 114 227 353 467
Exports .. .. .. .. 193 264 634 1,173 1,692 2,377 2,617
Imports .. .. .. .. 147 220 469 881 1,178 1,249 1,723
Net balance .. .. .. .. 46 44 165 292 514 1,128 894
Investment .. .. .. .. 105 102 81 122 147
Research & development 117 24 35 55 53 75 72 146
Number of employees .. .. .. 6,087 4,319 3,849 4,494 6,737 8,302 10,334 10,900
Revenues per employee




Gross revenues .. 363 278 184 301 390 757 1,320 1,778 2,671 2,678
Exports .. .. .. .. 197 264 622 1,137 1,617 2,221 2,393
Imports .. .. .. .. 150 220 460 854 1,126 1,167 1,575
Research & development .. 26 37 57 54 75 71 142 .. .. ..
Source: Embraer and MDIC/SACEX (trade balance data; 2000 and 2001 figures are January-November).
a The amounts expressed in US dollars were obtained using the average or the final rate of exchange of the commercial dollar during the
corresponding periods, depending upon whether they refer to the income statement or the balance sheet data, respectively.
17 In June 1995, after Wasserstein Perella’s failure to pay the money
it had pledged, Bozano Simonsen bought it out. Together, the three
main shareholders account for 60% of Embraer’s outstanding
common stock.
18 The government has the right to designate one board member
and has customarily chosen an Air Force general for such position.
Until 2001, a second board member, also a general, was elected by
the controlling shareholders. In 2000, the then Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Lampreia, argued that the government-appointed
representative could be a civilian, possibly a diplomat. He himself
was appointed to the board in January 2001 upon his retirement
from the government.
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outsourced and, following the dismissal of 1,200 white-
collar employees and 500 engineers and workers in June
1995 (Bernardes, 2000a, p. 292), the payroll fell to
3,849 workers at the end of 1996. In May 1996 workers
agreed to wage cuts and shorter, but more flexible,
weekly working hours to match a 10% cut in
management salaries. Productivity rose: between 1990
and 1996 the time needed to make a Brasília was
reduced from 16 months to nine.19 Four overseas
support centres were created and in June 1995, as the
first sign of its renewed confidence, Embraer signed a
risk-sharing agreement with United Technologies-
Sikorsky for the development and production of the
fuel system, fuel tanks and landing gear of the S-92
19-seat, twin-engine, turbine-powered civilian
helicopter. This deal, which is projected to account for
10% of Embraer’s sales revenues, gave the company
access to important technological advances in the field
of new materials (Invar) and virtual design (CATIA).20
2. The recovery
In 1989 Embraer decided to venture into what was then
a niche market for jets plying regional routes –generally
shorter than 1,000 kilometres and with an average travel
time of approximately one hour– with a 50-seater. The
ERJ-14521 project was stopped as the company sought
new owners, but was accelerated after privatization as
the new management deemed that the company’s very
survival hinged on its success. No one will be able to
say for sure whether the leap into jet manufacturing
was dictated by prestige motives –the desire of
engineers to prove their ability at developing an even
more sophisticated aircraft– or by careful attention to
market signals. Market intelligence was only created
as a formal corporate function in 1991. What is sure is
that the development effort came as regional turbo-prop
operators started upgrading to jets. As industry
liberalization made major carriers increasingly
dependent on the traffic generated outside major hubs,
“feeder” carriers were pushed into extending the length
of the “spokes” (the cities that are served by each hub)
and increasing the frequency of services. In addition,
passengers started expressing a clear preference for jets,
which are faster, more versatile, and cause less noise
and vibration than turbo-props. The market for regional
jets has thus grown by more than 50% between 1998
and 1999 and it is estimated that it will amount to at
least US$ 56 billion in the next decade (Financial Times,
2000). The already favourable prospects are made even
rosier by the upcoming expiration of the 1980s
agreements between airlines and unions in the United
States. These specified that “feeder” carriers would not
use planes with more than 70 seats, as the pilots of the
big airlines feared that if they did jobs would shift to
these lower-cost affiliates.
The ERJ-145 is lighter, cheaper to buy, and 15%
less expensive to operate than its main rival,
Bombardier’s CRJ-200 (which goes slightly farther and
faster and was introduced a few years earlier).22 Its
superior engineering performance partly results from
the incorporation of the turbofan technology developed
for the AMX programme, while its price competitiveness
owes something to the fact that 30% of its components
are shared with the Brasília (including the nose section
and cabin), as well as to lower labour costs. The new
plane was presented at the 1996 Farnborough fair and
secured its first contract with Continental Express, a
subsidiary of Continental Airlines.23 The 300th ERJ-145
was delivered to British Regional Airlines in September
2000, three years and eight months later. In comparison,
it took almost seven years for Bombardier to deliver
the same number of CRJ-200s. In 1998 the company
rolled out the first prototype of the ERJ-135, a 37-
passenger version of the ERJ-145, with which it shares
96% of its parts, thus lowering development costs and
making the smaller plane more attractive to operators
already committed to its larger counterpart.24 Riding
on this trend, Embraer returned to profitability in 1998
after 11 consecutive years in the red (table 1).25
19 “Embraer’s Little Jet Could Circle the Globe”, Business Week,
28 October 1996.
20 Embraer uses CATIA (Computer Aided Three-Dimensional
Interactive Application) as a standard geometric modeling platform
to reengineer aircraft manufacturing development processes and
improve integration of internal operations and relations with
international partners.
21 Embraer planes, which were originally designated as EMB, gained
the ERJ suffix in late 1997.
22 Nelson Silva, Managing Director, Embraer Europe, gave this
information in a personal communication.
23 The ERJ-145 is equipped with Rolls-Royce engines and with flight
instruments, such as engine-indication instruments, crew-alert
systems and digital flight control systems, produced by Honeywell.
24 For instance, pilots need only to be trained on any aircraft within
a family in order to be certified to fly all aircraft within that family,
and the same ground support equipment can be utilized. A long-
range version of the ERJ-145, operating on routes of up to 3,000
kilometres was also certified in 1998 and the first model of a 44-
seat jet, the ERJ-140, was delivered in July 2001 to American Eagle.
25 Operating results have been positive since 1996.
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Employment has grown to over 10,000 people, and as
the new workers are obviously younger and also
increasingly female, the unionization rate has decreased
substantially (from 48% to 28% between 1997 and
2000) (Embraer, 2000a, p. 79).
Exports now account for 90% of total sales and
Embraer claims to lead unit sales in the world market
for regional aircraft. The 1999 devaluation of the
Brazilian real reduced the wage bill from 13% to 9.7%
of production costs between 1997 and 1999 (Embraer,
2000a, p. 43), but at the same time it increased the
financial costs of raising new debt, as well as servicing
outstanding dollar-denominated liabilities, and reduced
the dollar-value of the funds budgeted for government
export programmes. This made it necessary for the
company to intervene directly to help some of its
customers to restructure their financial arrangements
or, when this proved impossible, to provide special price
adjustments. Embraer has also become Brazil’s biggest
exporter, accounting for 3.5% of total Brazilian sales
abroad in 1999. Although it buys roughly half of its
inputs abroad,26 making it the country’s second largest
importer, it recorded a positive net balance of US$ 984
million in January-November 2001. In 2001 Embraer
made substantial gains by buying parts at the beginning
of the year with a strong real and then selling whole
planes later in the year with a dollar that gave more
reaís in return.
3. The challenges ahead
At the 1999 Paris air show Embraer announced it would
build a new 70-108 seat platform, sharing
approximately 80% of the existing components (but
not the engine nor the wing design), which should
nearly double its production volumes. Prior to the
launch, Embraer held a number of advisory board
meetings with potential customers, in order to
incorporate their comments into the design of the
aircraft.27 The ERJ-170’s maiden flight was on 19
February 2002 and the first deliveries will take place in
late 2002, while the larger model will be available in
2004. Switzerland’s Crossair, the largest regional airline
in Europe, will be the first to exploit the technological
and marketing advantages (including a prestige factor)
associated with operating a brand-new aircraft.28
The rapid increase in the backlog of orders
presents substantial production challenges and, as the
new family of aircraft enters into production,
scheduling conflicts may emerge. Simply to deliver
firmly-ordered planes (i.e., those for which a customer
has made a contractual commitment accompanied by
a down payment),29 Embraer had to increase its
monthly production capacity by 33% in the course of
2000 (Embraer, 2000a, p. 14). Besides regional jets,
Embraer is also involved in a number of projects in
defence, aerospace and general aviation (table 2).
Construction work has started on a US$ 150 million
manufacturing and test site at Gavião Peixoto, a remote
(some 280 kilometres northwest of São Paulo) and
fog-free location that will enable airworthiness flights
of high-speed military aircraft to be carried out in
Brazil, instead of sending the planes to the Lake Moses
base in the United States.
In November 1999, Aérospatiale-Matra, Dassault
Aviation and Thomson-CSF each acquired a 5.5% stake in
Embraer, and Snecma bought a further 3%, so that the
company’s value rose to nearly US$ 1 billion. The French
shares will not carry voting rights, but they will receive a
10% higher dividend and will allow the new partners to
appoint two directors to the 11-member board. The French
consortium outbid rival proposals by BAe and Lockheed
Martin,30 all anxious to clinch a deal to improve their
chances of winning a possibly large order for the FX-BR
modernization programme of the Brazilian Air Force,
which is expected to demand that Embraer be given a key
26 “Embraer quer exportar US$ 9bi até 2005”, Folha de S. Paulo, 5
November 2000.
27 This input, for example, convinced Embraer to use two underwing
engines, instead of the engines-on-the-tail design for the ERJ-145
and ERJ-135 series, thus simplifying aircraft servicing and boosting
passenger comfort. This solution allows for full baggage and food
loading on the side of the aircraft with its engine shut down. During
ground servicing, the engine on the other side could continue to
provide electrical power and air conditioning. This configuration
should also help operators minimize turnaround times.
28 Crossair chose Embraer over competing propositions from
Fairchild-Dornier and Bombardier. According to a report by United
States trade officers based in Zurich, the principal factors in favour
of the Brazilian jet were the overall weight, the cabin configuration
(a single-aisle layout with a 2+2 seat configuration, versus a single
aisle with a 2+3 seat configuration on the Fairchild jet), a certain
amount of existing acceptance of the product, and an aggressive
pricing policy (Galambos, 2000).
29 For the sale of regional aircraft, Embraer customarily receives a
deposit upon signing of the purchase agreement and three progress
payments (each equivalent to 5% of the sales price) 18, 12 and 6
months before scheduled delivery. The deposit and progress
payments are generally non-refundable.
30 “BAe eyes 20pc stake in Embraer”, The Daily Telegraph, 14
August 1999.
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role in the deal.31 Embraer and the French industrialists
are expected to jointly promote the Mirage 2000 and Rafale
combat aircraft, as well as the turbofans and electronic
software produced by Snecma and Thomson-CSF.32 This
strategic alliance will increase Embraer’s military aircraft
sales, which currently account for 7% of total revenue,
31
 Between 75 and 150 aircraft will be needed before 2005 to replace
aging F-5s and Mirages, for a total cost of as much as US$ 6 billion.
In August 1997 the Clinton administration cancelled a 20-year ban
on sales of US high-technology weapons and aircraft to Latin
America.
TABLE 2
Embraer’s project portfolio (excluding regional jets)
Name Description and production volumes
AL-X Developed under a contract with the Brazilian Air Force (FAB). Two prototypes have been flying since 1995.
The maiden flight of the first pre-production aircraft took place in May 1999, and the first delivery was due in
2001. These aircraft, whose engine is twice as powerful as that of the standard Tucano, will be used for
advanced pilot training and for defence operations in Amazonia.
AMX The project resulted from 1977 Italian Air Force specifications for a small tactical fighter-bomber. Embraer
joined the original Aeritalia/Aermacchi partnership in 1980. The first prototype flew in May 1984, production
began in mid-1986, and the first aircraft of the 30-unit batch (21 for Italy, nine for Brazil) rolled out in Turin
in March 1988. A second contract (Italy 59, Brazil 25) was signed in 1988 and production for the Brazilian Air
Force started the following year. A third production lot was authorized in early 1992, with the first two-seater
for the Brazilian Air Force delivered in May 1992.
AMX-T An enhanced version of the AMX. Production began in  Italy in late 1994, where it was halted in 1998 (after
production of 110 single-seaters and 26 two-seaters), but it continues in Brazil. Approximately 190 aircraft
are currently in operation in the Italian and Brazilian Air Forces. In September 1999 the AMX-T won a bid to
supply Venezuela.
EMB-145 AEW&C and RS Special versions of the ERJ-145 unveiled in May 1999. The AEW&C’s advanced radar system, developed by
Ericsson, has the capacity to carry out supervision, patrol and air traffic control missions. The RS was designed
for remote surface measuring missions, environmental control and geological surveys. They are expected to
play a key role in the US$ 1.2 billion Amazon Surveillance System (SIVAM) being developed by Raytheon. The
Greek Air Force has contracted Embraer to furnish four AEW&Cs, to be used in its airspace advance warning
and control system within the NATO environment. An ERJ 135 aircraft for special transport and support missions
was acquired under this same contract. Mexico also selected Embraer to supply an AEW&C and two RSs for
maritime patrol duties.
EMB-314 Super Tucano A single-engine turboprop aircraft used for pilot training and armed reconnaissance missions. Some 650 units
of the first EMB 312 Tucano version have been produced and are in operation in 15 air forces around the world.
Currently under development is the AL-X configuration (Light Attack Aircraft), equipped with a 1,600 SHP
engine, advanced avionics and other technological advances, in both single- and twin-seat versions. In August
2001 the FAB signed a contract for 76 firm orders, with 23 additional options, to operate in basic/early advanced
training missions, including weapons familiarization. Production started in February 2002.
International Space Station An international project involving 13 OECD countries, Russia, and Brazil, which is responsible for assembling
a platform connected to the outside of the International Space Station for performing experiments. The Agência
Espacial Brasileira, which coordinates the Programa Nacional de Atividades Espaciais (PNAE), selected Embraer,
which works with Boeing.
Legacy A modified version of the ERJ-135, produced in executive, corporate shuttle, and VIP configurations, unveiled
at the 2000 Farnborough Air Show. With the addition of two more fuel tanks, the executive version has a range
of 3,200 nautical miles, enough to fly coast-to-coast across the United States or from Paris to the Middle East.
The maiden flight was in March 2001 and Brazilian certification was received. As at March 2002, Embraer
had received 25 firm orders and 50 options.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of data from Embraer and other sources.
32
 In April 2002 Embraer and its French partners established the “Mirage
2000 BR Consortium” to market a new version of the Dassault Aviation
Mirage 2000-5 Mk 2 in Latin America. The activities of the new
consortium, in all domains, will be co-ordinated by Embraer, which
will exercise the role of consortium leader. Analysis, development and
testing activities for the Mirage 2000 BR will be jointly performed, either
at Embraer’s facilities in Brazil, or in France. The final assembly line
will be at Embraer’s new plant at Gavião Peixoto.
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and its penetration into the Chinese market.33 The decision
was disputed by the Air Force commanders, who were
offended at not being consulted over the government’s
decision to back the deal and were concerned that
Embraer’s association with Dassault will oblige them
to buy French equipment. Following particularly serious
comments, the commander-in-chief was sacked by the
government.34 The Brazilian attorney general ruled that
the sale does not constitute a change of control and
that, insofar as it does not weaken the country’s national
interests, the government should not use its golden share
to block the deal.
IV
Making sense of the evidence
In the course of its 25-year history as a State-owned
enterprise, Embraer used licensing and co-operation
agreements to bring new resources and knowledge into
the firm and develop a strong core competence –system
engineering for producing aircraft. But while this
learning process was initially accompanied by progress
on other fronts –such as organizational and marketing
skills– by the mid-1980s engineering considerations
overtook other criteria in the minds of senior
management. Linkages between different parts of the
company –and a fortiori between Brazil and the foreign
affiliates that were supposed to provide advance
warning of what customers were demanding–
weakened. Writing in 1992, when Embraer was facing
the most severe crisis in its short life, Frischtak
acknowledged its ability to exploit a niche in the world
market, but singled out the lack of financial resources
and market-driven technical solutions as the main
bottlenecks preventing it from sustaining this success
over the long run. He also identified co-operative
development, production, and marketing agreements
as key actions to achieve recovery.
1. Top management
The post-privatization recovery owes a lot to the actions
implemented by the new management, which injected
a new corporate strategy to ensure alignment between
Embraer’s core competences and market signals.
Various forms of organizational changes have led to
innovations and improved performance. The hierarchy
was flattened by cutting the number of managerial levels
from ten to four, and performance-related remuneration
was also introduced for all employees (Ghemawat,
Herrero and Monteiro, 2000). Most importantly, a
number of activities —such as strategic planning, total
quality management, market intelligence, the kaizen
workforce empowerment strategy, and the analysis of
system performance feedback— were formalized and
endogeneized in the company’s routines (Bernardes,
2000a).
The process of organizational change involves
“vision”, learning by trial and feedback, and consensus-
building (Fujimoto, 2000). All these elements have played
a role, and although it is not easy to say how they rank,
vision has probably been the most important. In 2001,
Mauricio Botelho, Embraer’s CEO since 1994, won the
annual Laurels Award granted by the industry’s leading
magazine for “correctly reading the transformation of the
commuter airline industry from turboprops to jets –an
insight not gleaned by many established European and
American manufacturers– and focusing on a single
overarching objective: customer satisfaction” (Aviation
Week and Space Technology, 2001). It is important to
remember that at Embraer the formal creation of a market
intelligence function came after, and not before, the launch
of the ERJ family. Botelho, while a mechanical engineer
by training, did not have any background in aerospace,
and this may have it made it easier to spot the
transformation that was taking place in the industry.
The TOR (Transforming the Organization for
Results) Programme launched in 1997 stands at the core
of the learning process. In a phase of rapid growth, it
33 In September 2000 Sichuan Airline received the first of the four
ERJ-145s which it had ordered. This is the first Embraer plane to
operate in China and also the first Embraer jet in the Southeast
Asian market. In 2002 Embraer inaugurated a warehouse at Beijing
International Airport.
34 The Embraer controversy coincided with the government’s
attempt to take the management of the country’s airport system
away from the air force, in view of the system’s possible
privatization. See “De cavalo a burro”, Veja, 12 January 2000.
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has aimed at integrating the development of new
activities with constant review and improvement of
operational processes. TOR includes corporate initiatives
such as Integrated Technological Development (in the
areas of production, product engineering, and
information technology), emergency projects, data
cleaning, and implementation of the ERP (Enterprise
Resource Planning) system. As regards the personal
development and professional training of its workforce,
Embraer has implemented a Career and Salary Plan,
an Industrial Integration Programme, and a
Supplementary Retirement Plan. In 2000, the medical,
hospital and social benefits offered to employees
totalled R$ 124 million: an 81% year-on-year increase.
Finally, in 2000 the Profit Sharing Programme
distributed R$ 81 million, compared with R$ 36.6
million in 1999 (Embraer, 2000b).
2. Location
São José dos Campos stands in the very heart of the
Paraíba Valley and consists of 43 municipalities that
host 430 exporters and produce 3% of Brazil’s GDP.
Multinational corporations such as Ericsson,
Volkswagen, Ford and General Motors have established
some of their largest plants worldwide here, and this
has attracted additional investments in the component
and electronics industries. Embraer was able to tap into
these existing investments, playing the role of fulcrum
and co-ordinator in a network of specialized Tier II
suppliers (Bernardes, 2000b). While Embraer has not
taken equity positions, some such firms were created
in the mid-1990s by skilled technicians laid off by
Embraer and other aerospace companies (table 3). A
concerted effort to improve and deepen the articulation
between different private and public partners is
currently underway under the leadership of the São
Paulo industrial federation (FIESP/CIESP), the national
support programme for micro- and small enterprises
of the Brazilian Enterprise Support Service (Serviço
Brasileiro de Apoio às Empresas, Sebrae), and the local
business associations (Associação Comercial e
Industrial de São José dos Campos, ACI, and the Vale
do Paraíba Chamber of Commerce). The ultimate goal
of the Exporta Vale programme is to convert the region
into Brazil’s high-tech pole, with a strong presence of
locally-groomed start-ups, and increase the number of
exporting firms to 1,000 and the amount of foreign sales
to US$ 500 million by 2003.
Research and development activities —such as
mechanical analysis, thermal tests, electro-magnetic
compatibility tests, and vacuum simulations— have
been outsourced to the CTA. Within the framework of
the Parceria para Inovação Tecnológica —Partnership
for Technological Innovation (PITE) programme
financed by FAPESP (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa
do Estado de São Paulo— Research Support Foundation
of the state of São Paulo) to enhance collaboration
between business and the academic world, Embraer and
ITA have also launched a number of projects (table 4).
However, according to Bernardes (2000b), the links
with this and other local technology institutions, such
as the Escola de Engenharia de São Carlos and the
Escola Politécnica, are becoming looser as Embraer
increasingly resorts to foreign technological
institutions35 and sets up its own technology schools to
train personnel. The Engineering Specialization
Programme in the field of Aeronautics, an initiative
aimed at training newly graduated engineers and those
with up to two years’ experience, began in March 2001,
and represents the first step towards establishing the
Embraer Corporate University.
3. Partners
Several European and American aerospace component
suppliers chipped in as risk-sharing partners for the
ERJ-145, directly investing R$ 64 million (of a total
equal to R$ 592.7 million, roughly US$ 300 million)
in cash and materials and providing liquidity via
deferred payment provisions. First-tier suppliers
(table 5) deliver whole systems –rather than discrete
components– and take on the responsibility of
managing the supply chain by sub-contracting discrete
parts from lower-tier suppliers. In the case of the
ERJ-170/190 family, development costs are even larger
(about US$ 850 million) and are by far the largest
investment ever embarked upon by Embraer. No less
than one-third of these costs will be contributed in cash
by risk-sharing partners, who will be responsible for
developing, producing, and delivering entire systems as
well as major components. The whole process of selection
and contracting of the main risk-sharing partners took a
year from inception to completion. Requests for proposals
were sent to 85 companies, of which 58 submitted
tenders. Embraer will be responsible for the forward
35 Transonic wind tunnel tests are conducted at the NLR National
Aerospace Laboratory in the Netherlands and low speed trials at
the Central Aerohydrodynamics Institute of Russia (TsAGI). These
tests are primarily oriented towards examining the wing’s
performance in various segments of its intended flight envelope.
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fuselage, nose cone, centre fuselage II, and wing to
fuselage fairings. Some foreign suppliers (such as
Pilkington Aerospace, Parker Hanefin, and Sonaca)
have already set up operations in Brazil, while others
(such as Latécoère) are planning to do so (Gazeta
Mercantil, 2000). Embraer also created ELEB, a joint
venture with Germany’s Liebherr, to produce landing
gear and hydraulic components, which in November
2000 was merged with Órbita Sistemas Aeroespaciais.
This strategy should not only reduce Embraer’s
development costs and risks, but also, by reducing the
number of its suppliers and easing logistics, allow it to
TABLE 3
Brazil: Some of the aerospace companies located in the Paraíba Valley
Company Description
AEROSERV Serviços Established as a micro-enterprise in 1999, operating inside the Embraer plant, it has rapidly become a small/
medium-sized enterprise, with sales of US$ 5 million in 2001. It now has its own plant in Jacareí and 200
employees, 80% of whom previously worked at Embraer.
AKROS Founded in the early 1990s, specializes in structural analysis and mechanical parts design, product engineering,
and manufacturing processes. It has also been active in the space programme, specifying dynamic and static
testing, doing structural analysis, developing mechanical tools design, as well as preparing and reviewing
technical documentation.
CENIC Designs, produces and tests composite materials (carbon fibre) for mechanical parts and groups. Subcontractor
(composite motor cases, nozzle parts) for the VLS-1 (satellite launching vehicle)
COMPSIS Established in 1989, develops and produces numerically-controlled transport systems and testing devices for
the auto industry. Its product development and production technologies meet the DOD-STD-2167 and ANSI/IEEE
standards required for the acquisition, development or support of mission-critical software systems.
DIGICON Started its activities in the area of transducers and processors for numerical control machinery. It also produces
plotters and hard disks, as well as some CAD software. Produces mechanical components of structural parts and
subsystems for satellites of INPE (National Space Research Institute) and assembles satellite solar panels, in
collaboration with Germany’s MBB.
ELEBRA Produces, sells and distributes electronic communications equipment and electronic parts (radars, air traffic
control consoles, antennae and high frequency transmitters) and provides industrial and civil engineering services.
It reported sales of US$ 15 million in 1999. It has now been bought by the NORCAL Group. In the framework of
the CBERS (China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite Cooperation) programme, it was responsible for the
development of the on-board computers, the attitude and orbit control systems, and the design of UHF transmitters.
Gespi Aeronáutica Established in 1974 to design and manufacture parts and components for Embraer. Since 1990, its aerospace
division has developed other products, such as ground support equipment, aviation components cleaning
equipment, and anti-haze rocket systems.
MECTRON Founded by ITA graduates, it develops defence systems such as simulators for anti-tank missiles, electronic
equipment for medical applications, and traffic control systems. In the aerospace field, it has developed electrical
systems, electronic components and satellite control software, as well as some data collecting platforms. In
2001 the Italian Air Force awarded Mectron and Alenia a US$ 45 million contract to equip its fleet of AMX
aircraft with the SCP-01 radar.
N&N Informática e Develops customized software for image processing, process control, and product line automation. Customers
include the Brazilian Air Force and Navy.
Qualitas Engenharia Established in 1993 to develop management systems. Customers include Helibras and Embraer (development
of applications to simulate pre- and post-sale relations with clients and customer support systems).
TECNASA Founded by ITA graduates, specializes in electronic equipment for air navigation support, such as multimode air
combat radar (for the AMX) and several countermeasures systems. For the MEC-B and CBERS projects, the company
developed telemetry and telecontrol transponders and has defined specifications for several items at its design
testing facilities.
Tectelcom Aerospacial Subsidiary of the Tectelcom group.
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of company information and other sources.
 Aeronáuticos
Automação
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TABLE 5
Embraer’s risk-sharing partners
ERJ 145-135 ERJ 170-190
C&D (United States) Cabin and cargo compartment interiors Interiors
ENAER (Chile, State-owned) Vertical fin, horizontal stabilizers and
elevators
GAMESA (Grupo Auxiliar Metalúrgico) Wings, engine nacelles and main Rear fuselage and the vertical and
 (Spain) landing-gear doors horizontal tail surfaces
General Electric (United States) Turbofans, power plants and engine nacelles
Grimes Aerospace (United States) Exterior and cockpit lighting
Hamilton Sundstrand (United States) Tail core, auxiliary power unit, electrical
systems, and air management system
Honeywell (United States) Avionics systems
Kawasaki (Japan) Wing stub, engine pylon, fixed landing and
trailing edge assemblies, flaps, spoilers, and
flight control surfaces of the wings
Latécoère (France) Central fuselage sections
Liebherr (Germany) Landing gear assemblies
SONACA (Société Nationale de Construction Portions of the central and rear fuselage, Moving parts for the wing leading edges,
Aérospatiale) (Belgium, State-owned) service, main and baggage doors, and engine associated systems (actuators, de-icing gear),
pods panels and sub-assemblies of the central
fuselage section (including the wing
attachment)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of company information and other sources.
TABLE 4
Brazil: Embraer joint projects financed by FAPESP
Partner Total budget Embraer share Time frame
(US$) (per cent)
Development of a DGPS system for real time aircraft INPE 218,117 0 March 2002-
positioning August 2003
Advanced applications of computational fluid ITA 1,255,000 8 January 2002-
mechanics to high-performance aircraft December 2004
Identification of aerospace stability and control ITA 195,525 0 January 2002-
derivatives June 2003
Development of aerodynamics testing technology ITA 948,479 0 June 2001-
for high-performance aircraft May 2004
Source: Fundação de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo – Research Support Foundation of the State of São Paulo (FAPESP).
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concentrate on what it does better, i.e., designing,
assembling, marketing and servicing the final aircraft.36
The 38-month development schedule also aims at front-
loading problem-solving measures and identifying
interference problems that are very costly to solve if
identified after the first full-scale assembly (Thomke
and Fujimoto, 2000).37 Engineers from the risk-sharing
partners are sent to Brazil to work with their Embraer
counterparts. The ERJ-190 Joint Definition Phase started
in May 2001 with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, who will
be responsible for manufacturing the wings. A new
Virtual Reality Center, using virtual prototyping and
large-scale visualization to reduce time-to-market for
new aircraft, was also built. Embraer will use
ENOVIAvpm (Virtual Product Model) and CATIA to
generate digital mock-ups instead of physical models,
and all Tier I suppliers have been asked to install these
programmes in order to facilitate communication. The
master electronic mock-up is centralized in Embraer’s
computers, and a new, dedicated EDI (Electronic Data
Interchange) system, utilizing a safe satellite channel,
has been set up for on-line updating of the data bank.
4. Public policies
Finally, public sector institutions such as the BNDES and
FINEP (Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos – Finance
Fund for Studies and Projects, part of the Ministry for
Science and Technology) have actively supported this
process, contributing 22% and 100% of the
development costs of the ERJ-145/135 family and of
the AL-X light-attack jet fighter, respectively. Embraer
has also been the largest beneficiary of PDTI (Programa
de Desenvolvimiento Tecnológico Industrial –Industrial
Technology Development Programme), a programme
of the Ministry for Science and Technology which
provides fresh funding and tax holidays to innovating
firms.38 A total of R$ 142 million was assigned to
Embraer in subsidies between 1993 and 2000.39
Finamex (now BNDES-exim) allows BNDES to finance
up to 100% of capital goods exports.40 The Programa
de Estímulo às Exportações – Export Promotion
Programme (Proex), managed by the Banco do Brasil,
is an “interest rate equalization programme”, which
provides up to a 3.5% rebate on interest rates on loans
to purchasers of exported Brazilian aircraft. Its aim is
to offset the so-called Custo Brasil, i.e., the higher risk
of doing business in the country due to a number of
structural factors.
In this brutally competitive environment, the
rivalry between Embraer and Bombardier has
escalated from the enterprise to the national level.
Table 6 summarizes the various stages in this dispute,
which in May 2000 led the Canadian government to
ask the WTO for permission to retaliate by taking
compensatory measures and blocking US$ 3.3 billion
in goods and trade privileges over seven years –the
largest trade confrontation Canada has engaged in, and
one of the largest disputes in the history of the WTO.
The Brazilian authorities maintained that the threat
of sanctions “could make it difficult or even impossible
for Brazil to seek alternatives which would prevent
an irrational escalation of the dispute, with the capacity
to set off counter-retaliations or other measures that
would damage the economic and commercial
relationship in different areas”. Since then, new WTO
decisions have favoured Brazil, and Canada has
indicated it will comply with the February 2002 ruling.
The conclusions of a related study (Goldstein and
McGuire, 2002) consider that policy-makers’ ideas
about the goals of trade policy go a long way towards
explaining why this dispute drags on. For Brazil, its
place as a leader of the developing world acts as a
rallying point for government and firms alike. For
Canada, the belief in a rules-based trading regime has
led it to strongly oppose all violations, while insecurity
about its competitiveness has led to a variety of
government schemes to support firms in advanced
sectors like aerospace. The study also argues that the
WTO process has actually made resolution of the
dispute more difficult by making it too costly for firms
and countries to comply with the costs of losing.
36 Embraer’s programme for integrated product development is
described in Araujo and da Cruz (2000).
37 For instance, the use of computational fluid dynamics, digital
mockups and virtual reality made it possible to simulate the
introduction of winglets on the ERJ-170. Embraer decided to fit
them, as they improve fuel consumption and climb capability, as
well as Hot & High performance and obstacle clearance.
38 For details of the functioning of the export promotion mechanism,
see http://www.mct.gov.br/prog/empresa/pdti_pdta/default.htm.
39 Data obtained from http://www.mct.gov.br/prog/empresa/
pdti_pdta/pdti_res_20_12.htm.
40 At the end of March 2000, a little over half of the outstanding
orders were financed through the BNDES-exim programme (Embraer,
2000a, p. 12).
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TABLE 6
Dispute between Brazil and Canada in the WTO on export credits for regional aircraft
Event Date Description
January 1998 President Cardoso (Brazil) and Prime Minister Chrétien (Canada)
appoint Special Envoys to recommend ways to resolve the
dispute.
Special Envoys’ Report May 1998 Recommendation that the two governments should negotiate,
within two months, a bilateral accord.
Canada’s request to the WTO July 1998 To examine whether the “interest equalization” component of
Proex constitutes a subsidy within the meaning of Article 1 of
the ASCM (Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures)
and whether such subsidies contravene Article 3 of said Agreement.
Brazil’s request to the WTO July 1998 To examine export financing by the Export Development
Corporation (EDC) and Industry Canada provided as support for
research and development.
Appointment of panels October 1998 The European Union and the United States reserved their right
to participate in both panel proceedings as third parties.
DSB (Dispute Settlement Body) decision March 1999 Brazil afforded Embraer an illegal subsidy and should withdraw
it within 90 days.
DSB decision April 1999 Canada should withdraw without delay some subsidy
programmes supporting Bombardier. There is not sufficient cause
to pursue Brazil’s complaints about sub market rate financing
by the EDC any further.
Appellate body decisions August 1999 Upheld the initial findings in both cases.
Brazil’s status report November 1999 The interest rate equalization payments under Proex would be
granted only to the extent that they would bring the net interest
rate applicable to a transaction under that programme down to
the appropriate international “benchmark” (and not below it, as
had sometimes happened in the past).
Canada’s status report November 1999 The Canada Account financing of regional aircraft exports was
discontinued immediately, and all existing obligations to
disburse Technology Partnerships Canada (TPC) funds to that
industry terminated.
Bilateral agreement November 1999 Both countries filed notices requesting the reconvening of the
original DSB panels to decide if the two countries have complied
with the panel decisions.
Compliance panel ruling May 2000 Proex-based sales (affecting some 900 Embraer aircraft) cannot
proceed.
Appellate body decision July 2000 Upheld the previous decision.
Arbitration panel decision August 2000 Canada is entitled to impose tariffs on Brazilian goods worth
US$ 230 million per year until a bilateral accord is reached.
Interim decision June 2001 The reformed Proex does not necessarily contravene international
trade rules. In order for Brazil not to abuse the programme,
financing must be at market rates plus a premium for risk; loans
must be for no longer than 10 years; and the Proex loans must
cover no more than 85 per cent of the purchase in question.
Interim ruling October 2001 Canada asked for authorization to continue financing given to
three separate Bombardier jet buyers (Air Wisconsin, Comair,
and Air Nostrum).
DSB ruling February 2002 The EDC’s loan guarantees to three separate Bombardier jet
buyers constituted a prohibited export subsidy and must be
withdrawn within 90 days.
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Conclusions
The transformation of Embraer has been described as
“a saga from agony to glory” (Exame, 1999) and the
company itself as a “scrappy, audacious and canny
survivor” (The New York Times, 2000). Of course there
are risks –in particular the heavy dependence on a small
number of key customers (Continental Express,
American Eagle and Crossair), the substantial amount
of debt, and the results of entering into head-on
competition with Airbus and Boeing in the bottom end
of the full-size jet market– but the company appears to
be in a strong position to resist most shocks.
Domestic and international circumstances obliged
Brazil to change its approach to development.
Privatization was one of these changes, and indeed it
was the most important one in the case of Embraer, as
the change of ownership forced it to adapt to the new
scenario of rapid technological change, shorter product
cycles, and shrinking public financial capabilities. Its
success in an industry traditionally dominated by
American and European producers shows that firms
based in developing countries can adapt to changing
circumstances and adverse conditions. To be successful
in this, they must channel their resources into new value-
generating activities through product development, the
establishment of alliances, and strategic decision-
making. Management skills must be seen as the ability
to establish a network of linkages with various external
groups in order to maximize the value of corporate
resources.
How much continuity is there in this story? The
company recovered after privatization because the new
management introduced new forms of organizing
design, production, financing and marketing and
drastically reduced time-to-market. We should not
forget, however, that the project for developing the
ERJ-145, around which so much of Embraer’s fortunes
turns, started before the ownership transfer. The
capacity to use alliances to bring new resources into
the firm from external sources is undoubtedly another
constant in the story of Embraer. Insofar as the company
competes with bigger companies based in countries
with a richer endowment of human capital and
institutional infrastructure, Embraer necessarily had to
base its development on the identification of a reduced
number of core capabilities and their exploitation over
time. But the change in the relative bargaining power
is eye-catching. In the 1970s Embraer benefited from
the willingness of foreign assemblers to license
technology to a still minor industry participant in order
to enter the Brazilian and other Southern markets. Two
decades later, its partners are to be found among second-
tier aero-parts suppliers –some of them from OECD
countries– eager to count on Embraer’s credibility in
order to enter the world market.41 The recent French
partnership is also innovative since it allows Embraer
to integrate its own production capabilities with its
allies’ marketing skills in Asia and the defence market.
All the large and successful companies in the world
share the conviction that they must match their global
rivals in technology, productivity and entrepreneurial
drive. Is Embraer, which is one of the few Latin
American global players, any different?42 Not at first
sight, as it is just as aggressive, technologically savvy,
and outward-looking as any other fast-growing
corporation. In other words, it seems intuitively true
that, regardless of their national origin, only firms
capable of making a good return on investment in
manufacturing facilities, marketing systems, and
modern management methods can be successful (Dosi,
Nelson and Winter, 2000). At the same time, however,
“countries and organizations approach development and
globalization in different ways” (Guillén, 2000, p. 16).
The argument is usually justified: it pays to be diverse.
What is striking, then, is that Embraer has been obliged
to internalize some functions which, in most parts of
the world, are not considered to be the direct
responsibility of corporations. Thus, Embraer was able
to boast a fully literate workforce only in Christmas
1997, when almost 150 employees passed the Brazilian
second-level school certificate after attending a special
corporate programme (Bernardes, 2000a), and in 2002,
41 Sonaca and Enaer were only established in 1978 and 1981,
respectively, and for the former the collaboration with Embraer
accounts for 55% of its 2001 turnover. Gamesa created its
aeronautics division to participate in the ERJ-145 project, which
accounts for 90% of its turnover.
42 The arguments presented in this paragraph would be stronger if
I had explicitly compared (at least) Embraer and Bombardier to
analyse how they built up and exploited their organizational
capabilities.
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the Instituto Embraer de Educação e Pesquisa (Embraer
Educational and Research Institute) inaugurated a
special school in São José dos Campos (the “Engineer
Juarez Wanderley” high school).
Another special feature of Embraer is that,
notwithstanding its substantial market share and
satisfactory financial performance, it remains much
smaller than its rivals such as Boeing, Airbus, and
Bombardier (whose aerospace division is part of a much
larger group). Size is important in an industry such as
aerospace, where the ability to weather cyclical storms
ensures that skilled personnel and expensive machinery
are put to use even during a downturn (a problem
Embraer already experienced in the early 1990s). The
fact that the firm thrives as a stand-alone entity, rather
than as a division of one of the diversified business
groups that have traditionally dominated the corporate
landscape in emerging markets, therefore reflects its
ability to make the most of its resources.
Finally, there is another lesson that the Embraer
story can teach policy-makers in industrializing
countries. In its early phase as an infant player on the
global commuter aircraft market, Embraer received
government support through various instruments,
including targeted technological promotion, financing
and skill development. As non-economic objectives
of national pride and prestige also played an important
role, procurement decisions by the Ministry of
Aeronautics were adapted to the long-term goal of
enhancing indigenous technological accumulation. It
is important to underline, however, that the
government bodies supporting the company have
changed rather dramatically in the 1990s. Whereas for
many years the defenders of Embraer were mostly in
the Air Force and in engineering circles, in the more
recent past they are to be found in the BNDES national
development bank and possibly, at Itamaraty, the
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.43 While in the
past Brazilians were proud of a domestic company
capable of making aircraft, nowadays they are even
more pleased that Embraer is able to make profits.
The military, however, show a much higher degree of
admiration for the successes of the Brazilian aerospace
program and somewhat deride Embraer’s export
achievements by pointing to the high import content
of its products.44
In conclusion, then, Embraer has been able to
influence the structure of the world market for regional
jets, notably through export subsidies but more
generally through the support it received from the
Brazilian government. Insofar as high tariff protection
and local content requirements have not played a major
role in Brazilian policy for the aeronautics industry, it
has not been too difficult to keep in line with WTO rules.
The main exception, of course, is in the area of export
subsidies, although it should be emphasized that the
Proex export promotion system is a broad-based
instrument, not targeted to any specific sector. While it
is true that a more determined effort at reducing policy
inconsistencies on the supply side would have reduced
the need for an interest rate equalization programme
(Bora, Lloyd and Pangestu, 2000), it is unlikely that
Embraer could have survived in the real world while
waiting for Brazil to reach this stage of development.
Obviously, a more rigorous analysis is needed to
quantify the net results of Proex’s aid, although the
prima facie evidence is that it has allowed Embraer to
be a price-maker in its market. A similar reasoning
applies to the financing provided by BNDES, which
proved crucial in supporting the management in the
recovery phase, before Embraer gained access to the
New York Stock Exchange. A more immediate lesson
from the Brazil-Canada WTO saga, albeit perhaps one
devoid of normative value, is that non-OECD countries
are probably more easily caught out when practising
strategic trade policies —possibly because they do not
sit at the table where the negotiations to regulate export
subsidies take place.
(Original: English)
43 The Brazilian government has proposed the launching of a
Mercosur initiative to increase the size of the regional air transport
market and is considering removing domestic levies that currently
favour imported aircraft (O Estado de S. Paulo, 22 September 2000).
44 Interview with the Director-General of the Air Force’s R&D
department (in Tecnologia & Defesa, 1999).
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